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We find the claim that time is not real in both western and eastern philosophical 
traditions. In what follows I will call the view that time does not exist temporal error 
theory. Temporal error theory was made famous in western analytic philosophy in the 
early 1900s by John McTaggart (1908) and, in much the same tradition, temporal 
error theory was subsequently defended by Gödel (1949). The idea that time is not 
real, however, stretches back much further than that. It is common to hear it said that 
according to Buddhist philosophy (as though that were a monolithic view) time is 
illusory. While it is not true that, in general, either contemporary or ancient Buddhist 
scholars have thought time to be illusory, there are certainly some schools of Buddhist 
thought, such as that of traditional Dzogchen practitioners, according to which there is 
no time.  
Much more recently the claim that time does not exist has arisen in the context 
of contemporary physics. Attempts to reconcile theories of macro-sized phenomena, 
described by the theory of general relativity, with theories of the micro, described by 
the theory of quantum mechanics, have been notoriously difficult. Indeed, it has 
proven near impossible to develop a unified theory of the macro and micro that does 
not substantially alter one or other of the theories of quantum mechanics or general 
relativity. Various strategies for developing a unified theory of quantum gravity—a 
theory that covers both the macro and the micro—are known collectively as timeless 
approaches to quantum gravity. Their advocates typically describe these theories as 
ones that jettison time, and their proponents take themselves to be endorsing temporal 
error theory. Defenders of this view include Barbour (1994a, 1994b, 1999, 1999), 
Deutsch (1997) and Rovelli (2004, 2007, 2009).i 
Yet it seems unlikely that when McTaggart, Gödel, Barbour (et al) and 
Dzogchen practitioners say that there is no time, they are denying the existence of the 
same thing. Rather, it seems likely that each expresses a different proposition by the 
sentence “there is no time”ii. Realising that should also alert us to the likelihood that 
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when different temporal realists—those who hold that time exists—assert “there is 
time” they too might express different propositions.  Without knowing what 
proponents of temporal error theory mean when they deny the existence of time, we 
cannot know the extent to which they are in agreement with one another, nor the 
extent to which they are in disagreement with the temporal realist. Nor can we 
evaluate their claims about the non-existence of time.  
In trying to determine which propositions the English sentences “there is no 
time” and “there is time” express, it is helpful to know what someone who asserts 
either sentence thinks it would take for there to be time. Quite generally if we want to 
evaluate some speaker’s claim that “there is no X” we need to know, first, what the 
speaker supposes it would take for X to exist and, second, whether the world is a way 
such that given what it takes for X to exist, it turns out that X fails to exist. Mutatis 
mutandis if we want to evaluate a speaker’s claim that “there is an X”. 
In the debate between temporal realists and temporal error theorists it is often 
far from clear what proponents of either view think it would take for there to be time, 
and thus far from clear what their grounds are for concluding either that there is time 
(in the case of the temporal realist) or that there is not (in the case of the temporal 
error theorist).  
This paper is an attempt to set out a taxonomy of different views about what it 
takes for there to be time and, alongside that, a taxonomy of views about whether 
there is time or not, and if there is time what it is like. To be clear, however, the aim is 
not to attempt to settle facts about the world or to adjudicate the issue of whether or 
not the world is one in which there is time. The aim is limited to categorising kinds of 
temporal error theory and temporal realism in terms of two things (a) what each view 
takes to be necessary in order for there to be time and (b) what each view thinks about 
the way the world is with respect to those features.  
Even within this limited scope it is not possible to categorise every view in 
either western or Buddhist philosophy, and it is not always possible to be sure in 
which category a particular philosopher or group of philosophers belongs. 
Notwithstanding this, it is still a useful categorisation for those interested in how time 
has been viewed in both the analytic and Buddhist philosophical traditions. It is also 
useful for those wishing to investigate the extent to which the views defended by 
temporal error theorists are substantially the same, or different, and the extent to 
which the views defended by temporal realists are substantially the same, or different. 
	   3	  
Indeed, as we will see, it may be that some temporal error theorists share more in 
common with some temporal realists than with other temporal error theorists and 
mutatis mutandis for temporal realists. Before I turn, in section 3, to begin a 
taxonomy of different views about what it would take for there to be time, it will be 
useful, first, to draw some distinctions regarding the nature of truth, on the one hand, 
and reality, on the other hand. I now turn to that task. 
 
2. Truth and Reality 
 
There is no single set of distinctions that will allow us straightforwardly to map 
notions in Buddhist thought onto those of contemporary metaphysics. Having said 
that, there are some distinctions that will prove useful going forward. To that end, let 
us introduce a tripartite distinction between ultimate truths, derivative truths, and 
conventional truths. Ultimate truths are those that correspond to the nature of reality, 
in and of itself: that is, independent of any facts about us including our ways of 
conceptualising reality and our particular perspectival interests, preferences or desires. 
Corresponding to ultimate truth, then, is ultimate reality; ultimate reality is the 
domain of things about which ultimately true or false statements can be made. 
According to most Buddhist traditions ultimate reality is composed of simples 
(partless entities) that have a single intrinsic nature. It is worth bearing in mind that 
this additional claim about what it would take for there to exist an ultimate reality is 
not one that all contemporary metaphysicians would accept. For instance, one might 
be a structuralist who holds that, fundamentally, what exists are structures, and since 
structures are defined relationally this view would deny that ultimate reality must be 
such that its components have a single, intrinsic, nature.  
 Derivative truths, by contrast, are those that are made true in part by how the 
world is, ultimately, (by ultimate reality) and in part by the ways in which we 
conceptualise that reality and by the perspectives, preferences, projects, and desires 
that we have.  Let us call derivative reality the domain of things that makes true, or 
false, derivative truths. So, for instance, that strawberries are red would seem to be a 
derivative truth. 
We can now say that any statement, S, is strictly speaking true, iff S is 
ultimately true, or S is derivatively true.  
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That brings us to conventional truths. Following Siderits and Katsura (2013), 
let us say that conventional truths are truths such that action based on their acceptance 
reliably leads to successful practice. For instance, it would seem to be a conventional 
truth that there is an external world, since acting as though this is so generally has 
practical benefits. We can divide the conventional truths into those that are either 
ultimately or derivatively true, and those that are neither ultimately nor derivatively 
true. Call the former grounded conventional truths, and the latter mere conventional 
truths. If there really is an external world, then the conventional truth that there is an 
external world is a grounded conventional truth. Indeed, the reason why it is 
practically useful to act as though there is an external world is that there is. 
Mere conventional truths, by contrast, are not really truths at all since they are 
neither ultimately nor derivatively true. If one supposes the set of statements that 
compose a discourse, D, to be mere conventional truths, then one is an error theorist 
about discourse D. Let us call such a person a mere conventionalist about D. Mere 
conventionalism is a kind of error theory; but rather than being an error theory that 
embraces some sort of eliminativism about discourse D, the mere conventionalist 
thinks that we ought to go on engaging in the relevant discourse because it has certain 
practical benefits. Thus contemporary moral fictionalism is one kind of mere 
conventionalism; but it is not the only kind of mere conventionalism.  
 
3. What does it take for there to be time? 
 
To aid in our taxonomy I will introduce three categories. In essence the categories 
differ with respect to how high they set the bar for our world being one in which there 
is time. I will say that a view sets the bar high if that view requires that in order to 
have time our world must contain a fairly rich metaphysical structure. By contrast, a 
view sets the bar low if that view requires that our world have only a minimal 
metaphysical structure in order to have time. The three categories I introduce are the 
hard-nosed category, the middle-way category and the undemanding category. Each 
of these differs with respect to how high they set the bar. 
 
3.1 Hard-Nosed Category 
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The hard-nosed category encompasses views that set the bar high. These views are 
ones according to which in order for there to be time the world must be genuinely 
dynamical. It must either be that moments come into and pass out of existence, or else 
that which moment is present, changes, so that a moment is in the future, then moves 
to being the present, and then recedes to being in the past. A quick note of 
clarification here is in order. Henceforth I talk about the existence of moments (or 
times), and of the movement (or lack thereof) of the present moment. In Buddhist 
philosophy it is more common to talk of the coming into, and passing out of, 
existence of events (or objects and properties). My talk of moments, or times, is 
supposed to be neutral regarding what a moment is, and is consistent with a moment 
being a set of appropriately related events, objects, and properties.  
In the western tradition McTaggart is probably the first to systematically 
articulate a hard-nosed view. Indeed, it is McTaggart who sets out much of the 
apparatus in terms of which views on the nature of time are later defined. He 
differentiates between two orderings of events or instants: the A-series and the B-
series. The B-series is a way of ordering events in terms of the relations of earlier 
than, later than and simultaneous with. These relations are unchanging. If the 
extinction of the dinosaurs is earlier than the birth of Nixon, then the B-relation that 
obtains between those two events is invariant and static. The A-series orders events in 
terms of whether they are objectively past, present or future. For any time in the A-
series, that time instantiates a particular A-theoretic property (pastness, presentness or 
futurity) that determines its place in that series. The location of events within the A-
series is dynamic: a set of events, E, will be present, is future, and will become past.  
 The hard-nosed category encompasses views according to which in order for 
there to be time there needs to be an A-series ordering of events that is irreducible to 
B-series relations. On such views what it takes for there to be time is for there to be 
some dynamical movement of an objectively present moment and hence for there to 
be dynamically changing temporal facts. Thus on such views it is an essential feature 
of time that it flows, where temporal flow is characterised by the movement of the 
present or the change in facts about which moment is present. According to these 
hard-nosed views, then, it is also an essential feature of time that it is anisotropic. A 
dimension has the property of being anisotropic if there is some difference between 
the properties of that dimension in one direction compared to the other. So time is 
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anisotropic if there is a difference in its properties when we consider the earlier-to-
later direction as opposed to the later-to-earlier direction.  
It is easy to see why hard-nosed views are committed to the idea that it is 
essential to time that it is anisotropic. For if time flows then it must flow in a 
direction, and A-theorists suppose that in fact it flows from past to future and not the 
reverse. Thus, necessarily, time has a direction and flow, and is essentially dynamical.  
 
2.2 Middle-Way Category 
 
By contrast, the middle-way category is a category of views that set the bar somewhat 
lower than do views in the hard-nosed category. They set the bar somewhere in the 
middle. It is worth reiterating at this point that views in this category are views about 
what, at a minimum, a world needs to be like to contain time. They are not views 
about the way the world is; it is consistent with such views that our world contains a 
rich metaphysical structure such as a dynamical A-series. It is simply that, according 
to this view, a rich metaphysical structure is not necessary for there to be time.  
 Views in the middle-way category share the idea that what it takes for there to 
be time is for there to be an ordering of events by the relations of earlier-than, later-
than, and simultaneous-with (the B-relations) and for that ordering to be anisotropic. 
We could partition middle-way views into those according to which this anisotropy 
must be intrinsic to time, and those according to which it can be extrinsic. A 
dimension is intrinsically anisotropic if it is a feature of the very dimension itself that 
it is anisotropic; a dimension is extrinsically anisotropic if the contents of the 
dimension have some asymmetry that grounds a temporal anisotropy. Thus spatial 
relations are isotropic—space itself is not intrinsically anisotropic—but some regions 
of space might be extrinsically anisotropic if the properties of things in space going 
one direction are different from the properties going some other direction. Bits of 
space containing moving walkways are extrinsically anisotropic since moving in one 
direction is quite different to moving in the other direction. Thus we could divide the 
middle-way category into a hard-nosed middle way category, according to which in 
order for there to be time, time must be intrinsically anisotropic, and an undemanding 
middle-way category according to which time must be anisotropic, either intrinsically 
or extrinsically. For simplicity, however, I will treat this as a unified category. 
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Those middle-way views that hold that time must be, at a minimum, 
extrinsically anisotropic, suppose that, at a minimum, the contents of time must be 
asymmetric in some manner; there is then debate about which asymmetry of content 
can ground temporal anisotropy. There are two promising suggestions. The first 
appeals to causal asymmetry: the idea is that causation is temporally asymmetric—
causes either always or typically precede their effects (Horwich 1989). The second 
appeals to certain de facto asymmetries in the arrangements of events at, and across, 
times. The idea is that it follows from statistical mechanics that there are many more 
possible micro-states of the world that are, at the macro-level, disordered, than micro-
states that are, at the macro-level, ordered. Given that the world is now in some 
particular macro-state, S, it is more likely that the macro-states earlier and later than S 
are less ordered than S. So far we find no asymmetry. But if we plug into this picture 
the claim that very early moments of the universe were characterised by a highly 
ordered macro-state (typically known as the past hypothesis (Albert 2000; Kutach 
2011)) then this, combined with statistical mechanics, entails that entropy will, in 
general, increase away from this highly ordered macro-state. Thus the contents of 
time will be asymmetric: the contents will go from highly ordered to progressively 
less ordered. Indeed, on this view the earlier-to-later direction is simply the direction 
that moves away from the low entropy boundary condition. As with all views in the 
middle-way category, what is not required for there to exist time, contra those who 
embrace a view in the hard-nosed category, is for there to exist monadic, dynamical, 
properties of pastness, presentness and futurity.  
 
2.3 Undemanding Category 
 
Views that fall under the undemanding category are, unsurprisingly, views that set the 
bar low. According to such views all it takes for there to be time is for there to be an 
invariant ordering of moments in terms of the B-relations. What is not required is that 
time flows, or that time is anisotropic.iii According to such views there can be time 
even if there is no global difference between one temporal direction and the other, 
reverse, direction.  On this view temporal relations are similar (in certain respects) to 
relations such as greater-than, equal-to, and less-than: these latter relations order the 
natural numbers in a real, objective, ordering, but there is no sense in which the 
natural numbers really go from less-than to greater-than rather than from greater-than 
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to less-than. Undemanding views hold that the world can offer fairly meagre 
metaphysical resources and there still be time. In part that is because proponents of 
such views hold that what the hard-nosed and middle-way views take to be essential 
features of time are not really features of time, but instead are subjective features of 
the way that some beings located in time perceive the world. Thus, according to such 
a view, the hard-nosed and middle-way views are both misattributing, as essential 
features of time, features that really attach to psychologies in time. I will consider this 
in more detail shortly.  
 
3. A matrix of views 
 
So far I have laid out three broad categories of views about what is necessary for time 
to exist. As noted previously, that alone does not tell us anything about whether the 
proponents of those views are temporal realists or temporal error theorists. In what 
follows I put together a taxonomy of views that have appeared in the literature in 
terms of two things: (a) what those views say about what is required for the existence 
of time and (b) what those views say the world is like with respect to what is required 
for the existence of time.  Below is a table that represents the matrix. The three rows 
represent each of the categories of views regarding what it takes for there to be time. 
The two columns represent views about whether the world includes at least those 
features, or not. Thus hard-nosed realists will locate themselves in the top left hand 
box since they set the bar high regarding what the world needs to be like in order to 
contain time, but they also think that the world is that way. Hard-nosed error theorists 
agree with hard-nosed realists about what is required for there to be time, but disagree 
that the world is that way. Middle-way realists locate themselves in the middle left 
hand box. They set the bar in the middle regarding what they think is necessary for 
there to be time, and they think the world has (at least) the necessary structure for 
time to exist. Middle-way error theorists locate themselves in the middle right hand 
box. Middle-way error theorists agree with middle-way realists about what the world 
needs to be like in order for it to contain time, but they disagree with middle-way 
realists that the world is that way. Finally, the bottom row has undemanding realists in 
the left hand box and undemanding error theorists in the right hand box. 
Undemanding realists and undemanding error theorists agree about how the world 
needs to be in order to contain time, but they disagree about what the world is like: 
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the undemanding realist thinks the world has (at least as much of) the metaphysical 
structure required to contain time, and the error theorist thinks it does not.  
  
  Realists Error Theorists 
Hard-nosed Category Hard-nosed realists Hard-nosed error theorists 
Middle-way Category Middle-way realists Middle-way error theorists 




Let us consider, first, hard-nosed realists. In contemporary metaphysics those known 
as A-theorists are hard-nosed realists. So included in the top left hand box we find the 
following contemporary philosophers of time: Tooley (2000) Zimmerman (2008), 
Forrest (2006), Bourne (2006), Crisp (2003), Fine (2006), Tallant (2008) and we 
could include many more. There are three kinds of hard-nosed realist view. The first 
of these is presentism. According to presentists, only the present moment is real: only 
presently existing objects and events exist; there are no past or future objects or 
events. But which moment is the present changes and thus which objects and events 
exist, changes. Presentism is usually contrasted with eternalism, the view that past, 
present, and future, events and objects are equally real. Presentists and eternalists thus 
disagree about which moments exist, or, if you prefer, they disagree about whether 
past or future objects and events exist.  
The same two positions regarding ontology can be found in Buddhist thought. 
The Sautrāntikas and Theravādins hold that only present events and objects exist. 
They are presentists. By contrast, the Sarvāstivādins hold that past, present, and future 
objects and events are equally real and there exist static B-relations of earlier-than, 
later-than, and simultaneous-with, that hold between such events. They are eternalists. 
It is straightforward to see that the Sautrāntikas and Theravādins are hard-
nosed realists. According to such views the world is genuinely dynamical as new 
events and objects come into, and pass out of, existence. 
By parity, it would be easy to suppose that eternalists, such as the 
Sarvāstivādins, turn out to be middle-way or undemanding realists. For, on the face of 
it, it seems that eternalists must deny what the hard-nosed realist takes to be essential 
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for there to exist time: namely that there is an objectively present moment that moves. 
If that is right, then the eternalist who holds that time exists is not a hard-nosed realist, 
but she is a realist of some kind.  
It is, however, false that eternalists must deny what the hard-nosed realist 
takes to be essential for the existence of time. To be sure, most versions of eternalism 
are inconsistent with hard-nosed realism. B-theoretic versions of eternalism are 
usually known as block universe theories because they conceive of the universe as a 
four-dimensional block in which time is one of the four dimensions. The block as a 
whole does not undergo any change; events are related by static B-relations. Whatever 
is true of the block, is, tenselessly, true of the block. If the world is as block universe 
theorists suppose it to be, then hard-nosed realism is false and some other kind of 
realism is true. 
Not all versions of eternalism are, however, like this. The moving spotlight 
theory combines an eternalist ontology with the claim that there exists a moving now. 
In contemporary metaphysics such a view has been defended by, inter alia, Skow 
(2012) and Cameron (2015). According to such a view, although past, present, and 
future events and objects are equally real, and static B-relations obtain between events 
and objects, only one set of those events and objects are present—that singled out by 
the spotlight of nowness—and which moment is the present changes as the spotlight 
moves. The moving spotlight view is a second version of the A-theory, sitting 
alongside presentism. For it holds that the world is genuinely dynamical: facts about 
which moment is objectively present change, and time flows as presentness moves.  
One way of unpacking the metaphor of a moving spotlight is in terms of 
causal efficacy. On such a view what it is for a moment to be objectively present is 
for it to be the only moment that is causally efficacious and for that causal efficacy to 
move from moment to moment. Contemporary hard-nosed realists who think that 
moments other than the objective present exist, often ground a difference between 
past, present, and future moments by holding that only present moments are causally 
efficacious. We find such claims made not only by moving spotlight theorists, but 
also by A-theorists who embrace the growing block theory. The growing block model 
is a third kind of A-theory. On this model past events and objects exist, but future 
objects and events do not. The world is genuinely dynamical because new events and 
objects are constantly coming into existence: so the sum total of reality is ever-
growing. The view is known as the growing block because there exists a block 
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universe of events, all related by static B-relations, with the very last moment in the 
block being the objectively present moment. Yet the block grows as new moments are 
added to it and the moment that was the objectively present moment becomes 
objectively past, and a new moment becomes objectively present. This view is 
defended by, inter alia Forrest (2006) and Tooley (2000).  
Both the moving spotlight view and the growing block view are versions of 
hard-nosed realism, since according to both views the world is dynamical, there is an 
objectively present moment, and which moment is present, changes. But one view 
(the moving spotlight view) embraces an eternalist ontology and the other (the 
growing block view) embraces an ontology mid-way between eternalism and 
presentism.  
 So although the Sarvāstivādins are eternalists, it does not follow from this they 
must reject hard-nosed realism and instead embrace middle-way (or undemanding) 
realism. And indeed, when we examine their view further we find that they want to 
distinguish past, present and future, and do so by hypothesising that the difference 
between these times is that only the present moment is causally efficacious. If, 
according to the Sarvāstivādins, there is something special about the present moment 
that marks it out from past and future moments, then although they are eternalists, the 
Sarvāstivādins are not block universe theorists. Instead, their view looks like a version 
of the moving spotlight view. For they think the present is special in one way: it is the 
only moment that is causally efficacious. Since which moment is present, changes, it 
follows that the Sarvāstivādins are best thought of as moving spotlight theorists, and, 
therefore, as hard-nosed realists.  
Amongst hard-nosed realists such as the Sarvāstivādins we also find 
Longchenpa (1308-1363) who was a member of the Dzogchen tradition. Like others 
in that tradition, he distinguishes four times. The first three of these are the ceased, the 
not-lingering and the not-yet-coming. These map onto the past, the present and future. 
The description of these three times is dynamical: the not-lingering is that which 
passes into the past and the not-yet-coming is that which becomes the not-lingering 
and eventually the ceased. In Dzogchen thought the three times belong to our 
ordinary, conventional world and are essentially dynamical. Longchenpa, following 
others in the Dzogchen tradition, also distinguishes a fourth time, known as timeless 
time.  Within the Dzogchen tradition timeless time is typically held to be a 
changeless, complete, non-altering ground. It is timeless time that is real (Yao 2007). 
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Timeless time is the time associated with enlightenment. Thus, according to most 
Dzogchen practitioners, since there is no change in the enlightened state there is also 
no time. In this, traditional Dzogchen practitioners agree with McTaggart (1908) who 
argued that without real change, there can be no time. 
If we return to our earlier distinction between conventional, derivative, and 
ultimate truth, it seems clear that traditional Dzogchen practitioners suppose that 
hard-nosed temporal error theory is ultimately true. It also seems that they hold that 
hard-nosed realism is conventionally true because the conventional world can be 
described in terms of dynamical change amongst the-ceased, the not-lingering and the 
not-yet-coming. But, it would seem, if the ultimate truth is hard-nosed error theory, 
then this conventional truth must be merely conventional (for it cannot both be that 
hard-nosed error theory is true, and that hard-nosed realism is true). Thus, according 
to orthodox Dzogchen practitioners, there is an illusion as-of hard-nosed realism 
being true.  
Longchenpa’s understanding of timeless time, however, is somewhat different. 
He takes timeless time to be essentially dynamical. According to Yao (2007), timeless 
time is characterised by coming-to-presence. It is the self-organising principle of the 
highest reality. According to Longchenpa it is ultimately true that timeless time is 
dynamical. Since timeless time is real time (it is part of ultimate reality) it follows that 
Longchenpa, by contrast to other Dzogchen practitioner, ought to be categorised as a 
hard-nosed realist. For ultimate reality, according to Longchenpa, is essentially 
dynamical.  
 That brings us to Dōgen. According to some interpretations of Dōgen he too is 
a hard-nosed realist. Dōgen (1200-1253) was a Japanese Zen Buddhist who wrote 
extensively on what he called Being-Time (Uji). The correct interpretation of Dōgen 
is controversial. According to traditional interpretations, Uji means something like 
time is being and all being is time. On this interpretation Uji is the dynamical activity 
of the becoming of all things (Heine 1985; Stambaugh 1990). Read this way Dōgen 
ought straightforwardly to be classed as a hard-nosed realist. Indeed, read this way he 
sounds remarkably like some contemporary hard-nosed realists who think that 
temporal relations consist entirely in the coming into existence of new objects and 
properties and, in some cases, the passing out of existence of objects and properties 
(Tallant 2014).  
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 In contrast to this interpretation, however, Vorenkamp (1995) argues that 
Dōgen’s view of time is similar to the view that all that is required for there to be time 
is the existence of static B-relations. Vorenkamp argues that Dōgen’s view is similar 
to those of the middle-way realist because Dōgen is properly interpreted as holding 
that the appearance of temporal passage is not an objective feature of time itself, but 
rather, the result of our subjective perspective.  The idea is that for Dōgen the dharma-
positions are four-dimensional and do not move relative to one another (and indeed, 
could only do so if there were some additional dimension relative to which they could 
move, such as meta-time). Thus static relations hold between the dharma-positions 
and the what-Now-is-no-longer and the what-Now-is-not-yet.  Thus according to 
Vorenkamp the Uji can be thought of as a four-dimensional manifold in which the 
temporal relations between the individual dharma-positions are static B-relations. So 
far, then, Dōgen looks like a middle-way realist.  
 That is not, however, the end of the story. Vorenkamp recognises that Dōgen 
also seems to embrace the idea that there is a change of events with respect to time. 
For Dōgen, tense is real—events change with respect to their tensed properties and 
temporal becoming is a real feature of the world. One way of making sense of this, 
suggested by Vorenkamp’s reading of Dōgen (though Vorenkamp does not argue for 
this interpretation) is that Dōgen holds a version of the moving spotlight view. This 
would accord with the idea that, for Dōgen, all events have a static position in a four-
dimensional manifold, alongside the idea that tense is real, since according to the 
moving spotlight view which events are present is an objective feature of the world. 
However we understand the reality of tense in Dōgen, it follows that he ought be 
classed as a hard-nosed realist, though exactly which kind of hard-nosed realist he is 
will depend on how one understands his commitment to the reality of tense.  
 That brings us to the box on the top right. Inhabitants of this box are hard-
nosed error theorists. The hard-nosed error theorist sets the bar high in terms of what 
is required in order for there to be time, and, she concludes, our world turns out to 
lack the features required for time.  McTaggart (1908) is a clear case of a hard-nosed 
error theorist. He argues that in order for there to be time there must be a dynamical 
A-series. For, he thinks, in the absence of an A-series there would be no change in the 
world, and in the absence of change there would be no time. But, he argues, a 
dynamical A-series is internally inconsistent. For any time, t, that is future will be 
present and will then be past. So every time must have all three properties of being 
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future, present, and past. But no time can have all three properties since these 
properties are incompatible. Yet if a time has only one property—say the property of 
being future—then time does not pass since t is always future, and is never present 
and then past.  The only way t could all have three properties would be if it had them 
one at a time: first futurity, then presentness, then pastness. But that is only possible if 
there is some further dimension relative to which t itself can change its properties, and 
that would require that there is a second temporal dimension (meta-time or hyper-
time). But if there were a second dimension relative to which times can change then 
we could ask all of the same questions about the times in that higher-order temporal 
dimension, and we would either have to conclude that the second temporal dimension 
is static, in which case the totality of time and meta-time is static, or we would need to 
posit an infinite regress of temporal dimensions to explain how meta-time can be 
dynamical. In either case, McTaggart concludes, there is no time because what would 
be required for there to be time turns out to be not merely contingently non-existent 
but, in fact, impossible.  
Gödel (1949) is another hard-nosed error theorist. Like McTaggart he holds 
that time exists only if there exists an A-series. But, he thinks, if two worlds share the 
same laws of nature then if there is time in one there must be time in the other. He 
then shows that there are solutions to Einstein’s field equations that represent 
physically possible worlds (that is, worlds with the same laws of nature as our world) 
in which there is no A-series. But if such worlds lack an A-series and therefore lack 
time, then, he reasons, our world must also lack time since it shares the same laws. 
Thus, he concludes, hard-nosed temporal error theory is true.  
The table, below, shows the first row populated. You will notice that a figure 
that has not yet been discussed, Nāgārjuna, appears in both rows, and that his name is 
prefaced with the phrase “rejected by”, and, in one case, that is followed by a question 
mark. This might seem puzzling, and so it is to Nāgārjuna that I will now turn.  
 
 Realist Error theorist 
Hard-nosed category Presentists: Tallant, Crisp, Bourne, 
Zimmerman; Sautrāntikas, 
Theravādins. 




Rejected by Nāgārjuna?   
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Forrest. 
Moving spotlight theorists: Skow, 
Cameron, Sarvāstivādin school, 
Dōgen,  
Other Dynamical Views: 
Longchenpa,  
Rejected by Nāgārjuna   
 
Middle-way Category   
Undemanding Category   
 
Nāgārjuna is widely considered to be the founder of the Madhyamaka school of 
Mahāyāna Buddhism, and he explicitly considers the nature of time in his 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. In what follows I will first consider Nāgārjuna’s arguments 
about the nature of time, before turning to put these in the context of his work more 
broadly. It will be interesting to do so, in part, because the arguments bear some 
strong similarities to those that we find offered by McTaggart many centuries later.   
Here is how Nāgārjuna’s arguments proceed. If the past, present, and future 
are real properties of the world, (if they are part of ultimate reality) then either the 
future and the present depend on the past or they do not. Suppose they do depend on 
the past. For Nāgārjuna, if X depends on Y, then X’s existence necessitates Y’s 
existence. Now, it must be that either the present and the future exist in the past or 
they do not. Suppose they do not. If they do not, then the thing upon which they 
depend—the past—exists without necessitating the existence of the present and 
future. But if so, it cannot be that the present and future depend on the past. On the 
other hand, if the present and future do depend on the past then they must exist in the 
past, for the past must necessitate their existence. But the present and future cannot 
exist in the past and still be present and future. The general thought here is that when 
the past was around to ground the present and future, they were not around to be thus 
grounded, and when the present and future are around to be grounded by the past, the 
past is not around to do the grounding. Thus it cannot be that the present and future 
depend on the past.  
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Suppose, then, that the present and future do not depend on the past. That 
cannot be, for if the present does not depend on the past, and the future does not 
depend on the present, then there is no sense in which the events of the past, present 
and future, are in the same time-line. If time is a relation in which events stand, then 
an event is only past relative to some other event, and future relative to some still 
other event. If we have a single time-line of events then they must be related in this 
way, and so there must be dependency relations between them: the present and future 
must depend on the past.  
So either the present is in the past because it depends on the past, in which 
case it is nonexistent since it is not the present, or the present is independent of the 
past, in which case it is also nonexistent because to be the present is to stand in some 
relation to the past and that relation would be absent. Thus, past, present, and future, 
cannot be intrinsic features of time, and truths about time cannot be ultimate truths.  
What these arguments show is that the world is not a certain way: it is not a 
way that would make true hard-nosed realism. So we can be assured that Nāgārjuna 
rejects hard-nosed realism. But his arguments leave open that Nāgārjuna might be a 
hard-nosed error theorist, or that he might be some sort of less demanding realist. 
Most of Nāgārjuna’s interpreters conclude that he is neither a hard-nosed realism nor 
a hard-nosed error theorist. Instead, he is taken to be undermining some key 
presupposition that both the hard-nosed error theorist and the hard-nosed realist 
accept: namely that it makes sense to suppose that facts about past, present, and 
future, are intrinsic features of time and then ask whether the world is such that those 
intrinsic properties exist. If that is right, then, on the face of it, Nāgārjuna also rejects 
hard-nosed error theory. So it would be tempting to conclude that by rejecting the 
presupposition that hard-nosed realists and error theorists share, Nāgārjuna ought be 
classified as either a middle-way or undemanding realist: someone who thinks that 
what is required in order for there to be time is something more minimal.   
 Before we draw that conclusion, however, let us consider Nāgārjuna’s view 
about time in the context of the other arguments he mounts in the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Nāgārjuna’s aim in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is to argue 
for the claim (central to Mahāyāna Buddhism) that everything is empty (Siderits and 
Katsura (2013) and Kalupahana (1974) Garfield (1995)). To say that everything is 
empty is to say that nothing has an intrinsic nature. Thus, given what Buddhist 
scholars think it would take for there to be an ultimate reality (namely that the entities 
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in that domain have a single, intrinsic, nature) this is to argue that there is no ultimate 
reality and thus there are no ultimate truths.  
Viewed this way we can think of Nāgārjuna as rejecting hard-nosed realism 
and hard-nosed error theory, but not thereby as endorsing some other kind of realism 
about time. For if everything is empty then there are no ultimate truths. And if there 
are no ultimate truths, then there are no derivative truths either. On the assumption 
that any form of realism (middle-way or undemanding) is true only if there are some 
ultimate truths, it follows that Nāgārjuna rejects all forms of temporal realism. That, 
in turn, brings up full circle. For if all truths are merely conventional truths, then it 
seems as though Nāgārjuna is a global error-theorist. Since he explicitly thinks that 
we can go on using the language we do, and engaging in the practices in which we 
engage, because these are practically useful, it would perhaps be better to say that 
viewed this way Nāgārjuna looks like a global fictionalist: someone who thinks there 
are no truths, properly speaking, but that we can and should continue to engage in our 
current discourses and retain our current practices. Interpreted this way, Nāgārjuna is 
both a hard-nosed error theorist, a middle-way error theorist and an undemanding 
error theorist, since he supposes that what it would take to be any kind of temporal 
realist at all would be for there to be some ultimate truths, and it turns out there are no 
such truths. Thus to say that Nāgārjuna is for instance, an demanding error-theorist 
and, as it were, leave it at that, is misleading, since it implies that he agrees with the 
demanding realist regarding what would be required to vindicate temporal realism; 
but that is plainly false.  
Understanding Nāgārjuna as a global error-theorist cum fictionalist might, 
however, seem perplexing. It seems clear that one of the aims of the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is to show that no ultimate reality is required in order for our 
everyday claims to be conventionally true. Thus one might interpret Nāgārjuna as, in 
some good sense, rejecting the taxonomy of truths I offered earlier. If no ultimate 
reality is required for our ordinary claims to come out as (conventionally) true then 
one might wonder if conventional truths is, in the end, just truth. Interpreted this way, 
Nāgārjuna might be thought of as an early defender of a deflationary theory of truth, 
according to which there is nothing to truth except the T-schema: ‘x’ is true iff x. 
Viewed as a deflationist about truth, Nāgārjuna is best thought of not only as arguing 
that there are no ultimate (or derivative) truths because there is no way the world is, 
ultimately, but also that there are no ultimate (or derivative) truths, because those 
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notions of truth simply make no sense. But there are truths nonetheless: conventional 
truths. Interpreted this way, Nāgārjuna would not be rightly classified as a global 
error-theorist cum fictionalist. Instead, whether Nāgārjuna is a realist or error theorist 
about some particular phenomenon, such as time, would depend on which 
conventional truths obtain and which do not. Since arguably Nāgārjuna’s arguments 
give us reason to reject the idea that pastness, presentness and futurity are even, 
conventionally speaking, features of time, it seems most charitable to think that 
Nāgārjuna thus interpreted is best classified as some sort of middle-way or 
undemanding realist.  To depict these points of difference I represent Nāgārjuna qua 
global fictionalist as Nāgārjuna(1) and Nāgārjuna qua truth deflationist as 
Nāgārjuna(2) in the table below: 
 
 Realist Error theorist 
Hard-nosed category Presentists: Tallant, Crisp, 
Bourne, Zimmerman; 
Sautrāntikas, Theravādins. 
Growing block theorists:  
Tooley, Forrest. 











Middle-way Category Albert, Callender and 
Suhler, Ismael, Mellor, 
Horwich, Nāgārjuna(2)  
Nāgārjuna(1) 
Undemanding Category Nāgārjuna(2) Nāgārjuna(1) 
 
The next row of the matrix has middle-way realists on the left and middle-way error 
theorists on the right. According to contemporary middle-way realists there exists 
only a manifold of static temporal relations. No moment is singled out as 
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metaphysically special.  Many versions of the block universe theory fall into the 
category of middle-way realism. According to such views we can, however, make 
sense of talk of the past, present, and future in the same way that we make sense of 
talk of here and there. Just as ‘here’ refers to wherever the speaker happens to be (it is 
an indexical) likewise ‘now’ or ‘the present’ refers to whichever moment the speaker 
happens to be at. And just as ‘here’ is not some mysterious spatial property that 
moves around depending on where you happen to be, neither is ‘now’ a mysterious 
temporal property that moves (Mellor 1981).  
Moreover, say middle-way realists, if it seems to us as though time passes then 
that is an illusion caused by our subjective location(s) within time.  It might seem as 
though the past, present and future are very different from one another because each 
time-slice that partially composes a temporally extended person is in causal contact 
with a different moment.iv Since causation is by and large temporally asymmetric—
causes typically precede their effects—we typically know much more about the past 
than the future, for we typically have memories of past, but not future, moments. It 
therefore makes sense for time-slices to deliberate about matters that are in the future, 
but not those in the past. This leads us mistakenly to suppose that there is something 
metaphysically special and the present moment, and that the past is fixed and the 
future is yet to be determined. But this is merely the result of our subjective 
experience of successive moments in time combined with certain asymmetries in 
causation and knowledge (Ismael 2002; Callender and Suhler 2012).  Thus middle-
way realists share the idea that it is not necessary, for time to exist, that there is a 
genuinely dynamical dimension of our universe. Instead, the appearance of such a 
dimension is explained as the result of our subjective perspective on a set of static 
temporal relations. (Albert 2000; Callender and Suhler 2012; Ismael 2002; Mellor 
1981; Horwich 1989).  
 It is unclear whether there are any contemporary middle-way error theorists, 
though it is easy to see how one could come to be so. For instance, one might accept 
that dynamism is not necessary for the existence of time, but think that intrinsic 
anisotropy is essential to time. If one then concluded that there is no intrinsic 
anisotropy, then one would become a middle-way error theorist.  
Finally we come to the last row in our matrix. It represents those, in the left 
hand box, who are undemanding realists, and those, in the right hand box, who are 
undemanding error theorists.  
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Contemporary undemanding realists hold that in order for there to be time 
there must exist a manifold of events such that there is a fact of the mater regarding 
the spatio-temporal distances between those events. There needs to be a partial 
ordering of events in terms of the asymmetric B-relations.v But not only does there 
not need to be any objective, dynamical, monadic A-properties, neither is it essential 
to time that it is (globally) anisotropic. On this view there is nothing importantly 
different between the temporal direction that goes from what we call earlier-to-later, 
and what we call later-to-earlier. Indeed, on this view it is an entirely perspectival 
matter which moment is the first moment and which is the last moment. It is entirely 
perspectival whether A is earlier than B, or B is earlier than A. Due to this, some 
undemanding realists are known as temporal perspectivalists. According to temporal 
perspectivalists, not only is the apparent flow of time a subjective feature of our 
psychologies, so too is the apparent direction of time.  
Perspectivalists suggest that our subjective experience as of time having a 
direction is due, in part, to contingent features of the distribution of events in our local 
region, and, in part, to the way beings like us deliberate and reason. Some 
perspectivalists argue that it is necessary for deliberation that we carve the world into 
two categories—options and fixtures. Options includes the alternatives from which a 
deliberator chooses, and fixtures includes those matters the deliberator takes herself to 
know and those matters she regards as at least in principle knowable before any 
choice is made (Price 2007).vi A deliberator cannot treat a matter as something to be 
decided by the deliberative process whilst at the same time taking it as fixed, and she 
must treat some matters as fixed and thus the basis upon which to deliberate. Thus 
deliberators must partition the world into fixtures and options. But what things an 
agent puts into each partition is, the perspectivalist argues, a result of his or her 
perspective. That is because it is a contingent matter that we have epistemic access to 
events in one direction (what we call the past) but not the other. To see this 
perspectivalists ask us to imagine something known as a Gold universe. A Gold 
universe looks like our universe (and might be our universe for all we know) except 
that each temporal end of it is a mirror image of the other temporal end. Thus where 
entropy increases in one direction away from a boundary, entropy decreases towards 
the other boundary. Perspectivalists argue that from the perspective of agents located 
at the other end of the universe things would seem just the same as they do at the 
opposite end. But the direction those at one end call future would be the direction 
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those at the other end call past, and what the former call earlier-to-later is what the 
latter call later-to-earlier. These agents would have quite different views about which 
events are earlier than which others, and, according to the perspectivalist, there is no 
fact of the matter who is right, or, alternatively both are right given their particular 
perspective (Price 2007).  
Thus undemanding realists share with middle-way realists the thought that 
some of what the hard-nosed realist attributes to time ought to be attributed to our 
subjective experience of the world around us; but they go further than the middle-way 
realist in locating more features in our subjective perspective and fewer in the nature 
of time itself.vii  
 Barbour (1999; 1994a; 1994b), Deutsch (1997) and Rovelli (2001; 2004; 
2009), on the other hand, are undemanding error theorists.  They hold, very roughly, 
that our world is a configuration space of three-dimensional instants. Each three-
dimensional ‘instant’ is an arrangement of particles in the three spatial dimensions. So 
each such object looks like a snapshot of our world at a single moment. But according 
to this view not only are there no dynamical relations between these three-
dimensional instants, there are no causal or temporal relations between them either. 
They are not related even by the static B-relations of earlier than, later than, and 
simultaneous with. It is not true that an event in one instant is the cause of an event at 
some other instant. Instead, there is one big static configuration space of such instants, 
and that is all. There is no sense in which the moments (and events and objects) in our 
world are, as it were, strung out along a linear dimension such that each moment has a 
place along that dimension and such that there is a metric of distances between said 
moments. Instead, there are no connections between these moments (and the events 
and objects located at them) other than relations of similarity. By and large it seems as 
though these physicists agree that if the world were the way the undemanding realist 
says it is, then our world would contain time. But since they think our world is not 
that way they conclude that temporal error theory is true  
 Thus our final matrix looks like this: 
 
 Realist Error theorist 
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Sautrāntikas, Theravādins. 
Growing block theorists:  
Tooley, Forrest. 









Middle-way Category Albert, Callender and 
Suhler, Ismael, Mellor, 
Horwich,  Nāgārjuna(2)  
Nāgārjuna(1) 
Undemanding Category Price  
Nāgārjuna(2) 






In general there are a couple of interesting lessons to take away from this matrix. The 
first is that when we look across the rows we see agreement along one axis and 
disagreement along another. We see what we might call conceptual agreement: that 
is, agreement about the concept of time. For any view in the same row agrees about 
what it takes for time to exist. We also see ontological disagreement across the rows: 
disagreement about the way the world is. When we look straight down the columns, 
by contrast, we see conceptual disagreement: disagreement about what it takes for 
there to be time. Thus even though the first column is populated by temporal realists, 
we should be careful in thinking that these views have more in common than they 
really do: for the views that temporal realists in each row in that column defend are 
quite different from one another. Likewise, when we look down the second column 
we find all temporal error theorists, but again, we need to be careful not to conclude 
that these views share much in common. Apparent agreement can really amount to 
quite a lot of disagreement. Conversely, there is scope to see interesting ontological 
	   23	  
agreement along the right/left diagonal. For instance, in some cases the hard-nosed 
error theorist will agree with the middle-way realist about the way the world is but 
will disagree about what it takes for there to be time (conceptual disagreement). 
Likewise, some middle-way error theorists will agree with undemanding realists 
about the way the world is but disagree about whether this means there is time 
(conceptual disagreement). 
Thus a careful exploration of the rows, columns, and diagonals of this matrix 
gives us a much better, more nuanced, picture of the possible versions of temporal 
realism and temporal error theory that are out there, and a better idea with respect to 
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would still think that there is time. Likewise, the middle-way realist typically thinks that only the 
medium amounts of metaphysical structure required by middle-way views about time actually obtain. 
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